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Abstract
What is the role of contracting schemes for the welfare costs of nominal rigidi-
ties over the business cycle? We examine 5 different modeling schemes of nominal
rigidities that all have the same average duration of contracts. We ﬁnd that Calvo
(1983) wage and price contracts may deliver welfare costs that are 3-4 times higher
than Taylor (1980) contracts. However, that result is sensitive to the monetary policy
rule. It does not hold generally, that Calvo (1983) contracts yields higher welfare
cost than Taylor (1980) or Wolman (1999) contracts. The sticky information scheme
of Mankiw and Reis (2002) is shown to deliver welfare costs of nominal rigidities
that are smallest of all schemes and typically smaller than 0.07 of period consump-
tion, the Lucas (2003) cost of consumption variability. We discuss the implications
of modeling capital mobility. We show further that our key results also hold in the
more complex model of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004) which has better em-
pirical support.
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11 Introduction
The welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations have been an important topic for macroe-
conomic research since the seminal paper by Lucas (1987). Lucas (2003) focused on the
variability of consumption and has argued that the costs of cyclical ﬂuctuations are very
small, roughly 0.07 percent of steady state consumption. Recently, a number of studies
have employed new Keynesian monetary models with sticky prices and wages to ﬁnd that
the welfare costs could be much larger. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004) show that
the costs of nominal inertia may be 20-60 larger than the costs of consumption variability
computed by Lucas (2003).
Nominal rigidities can be modeled in many different ways in New Keynesian models.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the role of wage and price contracting schemes
for the welfare costs of nominal rigidities.1 Most monetary models adopt the scheme
of Calvo (1983) for introducing nominal stickiness. Despite its popularity, the scheme
has several unappealing properties. Collard and Dellas (2005) point out that ”a well-
known but unfortunate feature of this scheme is that there exists a non-zero set of ﬁrms
that almost never adjust their prices”. Similarly, Bergin and Tchakarov (2003) note that
”under Calvo pricing, some ﬁrms are forced to retain prices arbitrarily far away from
the optimal price, which can inﬂuence the welfare implications in a way viewed by some
as unreasonable”. The main contribution of this paper is to compute the welfare costs
of nominal rigidities across several popular modeling devices for stickiness in nominal
contracts. In doing so, we address an issue identiﬁed by Woodford (2003), who writes
that ” to deal with other, possibly more realistic distributions of intervals between price
changes, is an important topic for future research.”
This paper is motivated by recent work of Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004). These
authors ﬁnd that Calvo (1983) contracts imply much larger dispersion of output across
ﬁrms in the steady state induced by trend inﬂation and therefore lower steady welfare than
Taylor (1980) contracts of equal average duration. An important and natural question is
whether the use of the Calvo (1983) scheme has similar implications for quantifying the
welfare costs of nominal rigidities over the business cycle rather than in the steady state.
Monetary general equilibrium models that feature steady state inﬂation often assume that
agents can index their contracts to the trend inﬂation rate, thereby completely bypassing
the point made in Ascari (2004). It is an open question, to what extent the ﬁndings of
Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004) are also relevant for the costs of nominal rigidities over
the business cycle in an environment without trend inﬂation or equivalently with full
indexation to the trend inﬂation rate.
We build on the paper by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) who analyze welfare in
a model with nominal stickiness in wage and price setting. The models of nominal rigidi-
ties we consider are the following: Random price adjustment of Calvo (1983), a truncated
version of the Calvo (1983) scheme, N period overlapping contracts as in Taylor (1980),
a more general scheme with time varying adjustment probabilities as suggested by Wol-
man (1999) and ﬁnally variants of the sticky information scheme of Mankiw and Reis
1Roberts (1995) has shown that Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) contracts as well as Rotemberg (1982)
quadratic adjustment costs give rise to similar Phillips curves. This does not imply that the welfare costs
of nominal rigidities must be similar, as the Phillips curves are similar only after linearization, whereas
welfare measures take into account some of the nonlinearity of the model.
2(2002). All of these schemes imply that the welfare cost of nominal rigidities stem from
the dispersion of differentiated goods across producers or of differentiated labour across
workers. Thus we consider a homogenous family of modeling devices for nominal rigidi-
ties.2 When comparing these schemes we require an equal expected duration over which
newly set contracts or information sets are ﬁxed.3 In such a way no model implies more
exogenous stickiness on average. While this metric is typically assumed in the literature,
it is not the only obvious choice. We also report results when choosing the average age in
a cross-section of contracts as our metric, taking into account recent criticism by Dixon
and Kara (2005) .
The schemes suggested by Taylor (1980), Wolman (1999) all relax at least one un-
pleasant assumption of the Calvo (1983) contracts. Taylor (1980) contracts truncate the
horizon in the expectation formation of price and wage setters, which is inﬁnite in the
scheme of Calvo (1983). Wolman (1999) additionally relaxes the assumption that ad-
justment probabilities are independent of time elapsed since last adjustment. Finally, the
Mankiw and Reis (2002) scheme provides a tractable framework for considering limited
availability of information, often seen as one possible micro-foundation for sticky nomi-
nal contracts.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Overall, we ﬁnd that the welfare
costs or nominal rigidities depend very strongly on how these rigidities are modeled.
These costs range from 0.01 of one per cent of period consumption to 0.32 of one per
cent, depending on the monetary policy rule in place and on the particular contracting
scheme chosen. We ﬁnd that Calvo (1983) contracts may imply much higher welfare
costs of nominal rigidities than schemes with a narrower support of the distribution of
intervals between price or wage changes but equal mean. In the baseline parameterization
of the model, Calvo (1983) contracts give rise to welfare costs of nominal rigidities that
are more than 3 times as high as for Taylor (1980) contracts. This supports the view that
the use of Calvo (1983) contracts may inﬂuence welfare calculations in a very special
way. However, the ﬁnding that Calvo (1983) contracts imply higher welfare costs is not
general. Contrary to the results by Kiley (2002) for the steady state effects of inﬂation,
Calvo (1983) contracts may also imply similar or even slightly smaller welfare costs over
the business cycle than Taylor (1980) contracts. The intuition for this result is as follows.
When the age distribution has larger support, there are some agents that charge prices set
farther in the past. Their contract price tends to be more out of line with current economic
conditions. While that effect typically increases the welfare costs, those agents setting
prices today will look farther into the future and also charge a price that reﬂects less on
current economic conditions. Therefore widening the support of the age distribution as
done in the Calvo (1983) scheme has an ambiguous impact on relative price dispersion
and therefore on welfare.
When restricting the ability to obtain current information rather than directly restrict-
ing the ability to reset contracts, we ﬁnd that the welfare costs of nominal rigidities are
typically much smaller. For all considered monetary policy rules and for all considered
2An often used scheme missing from this comparison is Rotemberg (1982) quadratic adjustment costs.
We do not consider it here, since it does not belong to the family of rigidities that imply dispersion of output
across ﬁrms or hours across workers. Furthermore, the derivation of welfare based loss function is not as
easily done as with the other schemes.
3The duration is equal to the inverse of the frequency of contract adjustment.
3age distributions of information sets, the welfare costs of nominal rigidities are smaller
than the cost of consumption variability computed by Lucas (2003), i.e. less than 0.07 of
one per cent of consumption.
Intheﬁnalsectionweperformarobustnesscheckthatexplorestheroleofaneconomy
wide rental market for capital. The absence of a rental market for capital represents a
source of real rigidity identiﬁed by Ball and Romer (1990) and Kimball (1995) to be
important for the business cycle analysis of monetary models.4 We show that imposing
ﬁrm speciﬁc capital has two opposite effects on the welfare costs of nominal rigidities
that may be largely offsetting. A given amount of relative price dispersion is more costly
in welfare terms since there is more dispersion of labour across ﬁrms. However, speciﬁc
capital makes ﬁrms more reluctant to changes prices, since marginal cost now depends on
the price they charge. Hence, there is less price dispersion in equilibrium. We ﬁnd that
the relative welfare costs of nominal rigidities across the considered contracting schemes
do not depend strongly on how we model capital.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of the model. In section
3, we describe our alternative wage and price setting schemes. Section 4 collects the
log-linearized necessary conditions for equilibrium and the model’s baseline calibration.
Section 5 computes the welfare costs of nominal rigidities for our considered schemes.
In section 6 we take up the aforementioned robustness check. Finally, section 7 brieﬂy
summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes. An appendix contains the sensitivity analysis
with respect to key parameters.
2 Model
The model is based on Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). In particular, capital is
in ﬁxed supply in the aggregate. In the baseline model, we assume that there exists an
economy-wide rental market that allows capital to move freely between ﬁrms. This as-
sumption is relaxed in a robustness check. We assume further that subsidies exist that
completely offset the effects of monopolistic competition in the steady state in order to
avoid involved derivations of the loss function that would arise with an inefﬁcient steady
state.5 Finally, following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) households can fully insure
against the idiosyncracies in income streams arising from nominal wage rigidities. While
this may bias the welfare costs of nominal rigidities, it greatly facilitates the analysis.
4For an early treatment see Henderson (1973)
5Recently Benignio and Woodford (2004) have shown that not assuming the subsidies, the quadratic
welfare criterion used here and the relative weights attached to the elements in that criterion still apply as
long as there are no government purchases. When government purchases are present and not unreasonably
large, the relative weights in the welfare function change only slightly and the output gap must be deﬁned
differently. However, the levels of the weights will increase in the severity of the steady state distortion
no matter whether government purchases are present or not. Since government purchases are absent in our
model, we do not introduce any bias into the analysis of the relative welfare costs of different contracting
schemes by conveniently assuming subsidies, whereas the levels are affected by our assumption.
42.1 Households
There is a continuum of households with unit mass indexed by h. Households are in-
ﬁnitelylived, supplylabourNt(h)andreceivenominalwagesWt(h), consumeﬁnalgoods
Ct(h), and purchase state contingent securities Bt(h). Furthermore, they receive lump
sum transfers Tt as well as proﬁts ¡t(h) from the monopolistic retailers and hold nominal
money balances Mt(h). The utility function is assumed to be separable in consumption,























s.t. Ct(h) =(1 + ¿w)
Wt(h)
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The function H(¢) depicts the utility ﬂow arising from real money balances, often used
as a shortcut for a more explicit role for money, such as a cash-in-advance constraint. We
assume that the utility from real money balances is arbitrarily small. Following Wood-
ford (2003) we omit the ﬁrst-order condition for money holdings. Given that the we
model monetary policy as an interest rate rule, this equation merely serves to back out
the quantity of money that supports a given nominal interest rate. Bt is a row vector of
state contingent bonds, where each bond pays one unit in a particular state of nature in
the subsequent period. The column vector ±t+1;t represents the price of these bonds. The
role of the bonds is to allow perfect consumption insurance against labour income risk
stemming from nominal rigidities in wage setting. ¿w is a wage subsidy used to offset
the steady state effects of monopolistic competition in the labour market. The ﬁrst order
conditions for consumption and state contingent bond holdings give rise to the standard
Euler equation. Note that consumption is perfectly insured against idiosyncratic labour















t is the nominal interest rate on a non-contingent bond.
A continuum of households supply differentiated labour Nt(h), which is aggregated









; k > 1: (2)







Here Wt is the Dixit-Stiglitz wage index.
52.2 Production
Firms in the ﬁnal good sector produce a homogeneous good, Yt, using intermediate goods,
Yt(z), as input in production. There is a continuum of intermediate goods of unit mass.










where ² > 1. The solution to the problem of optimal factor demand yields the following







A continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods ﬁrms indexed by
z 2 [0;1] and owned by consumers uses labour Lt(z) and capital Kt(z) to produce output




At denotes total factor productivity, which follows an exogenous stochastic process. Cap-
ital is freely mobile across ﬁrms rather than being ﬁrm speciﬁc. Firms rent capital from
households in a competitive market on a period by period basis after they observe the ag-






tLt(z) + ZtKt(z) s.t. AtLt(z)
1¡®Kt(z)
® ¡ Yt = 0: (7)
Here, wr
t is the real wage and Zt the real rental rate for capital. Let Xt(z) denote the
Lagrange multiplier with respect to the constraint, i.e. real marginal cost. The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to Lt(z) and Kt(z) are given by:
w
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The ﬁrst order conditions imply that all ﬁrms choose the same capital to labour ratio,
therefore marginal cost Xt is equalized across ﬁrms.
2.3 The efﬁciency gap and monetary policy








Â + ® + (1 ¡ ®)¾
¸
b At: (10)
6Throughout this text, for any variable Xt, ¹ X denotes its steady value and ^ Xt ´ logXt ¡ log ¹ X
6One can use this equation together with the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition for labour demand,
to derive a key equation for this model. This equation links marginal cost to the output
gap, Yt ¡ Y ¤
t , and the gap between the average marginal rate of substitution between


















between consumption and labour is equal to the real wage and the last term in brackets
vanishes. We then recover the condition from sticky price models that marginal cost is
log-linearly related to the output gap. When prices are perfectly ﬂexible as well, the
marginal product of labour is equal to the real wage, i.e. log marginal cost is zero. It
follows that the output gap is zero.
Monetary policy is assumed to follow an interest rate as suggested by Henderson and
McKibbin (1993) or Taylor (1993). We consider the following functional form that is
often used in the empirical description of central bank behaviour:
^ R
n
t = (1 ¡ ®2)®0
³




+ (1 ¡ ®2)®1^ ¼t + ®2 ^ R
n
t¡1 + vt: (12)
Here vt is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock capturing non-systematic central bank be-
haviour.
3 Alternative wage and price setting schemes
There are many different ways in which nominal rigidities can be modeled in New Key-
nesian models. The apparatus of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) has emerged as a widely
used standard in the analysis of welfare effects of monetary policy, see e.g. Pappa (2004),
Kollmann (2004), Kollmann (2002), Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) or Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997).
Recently, Ascari (2004) and Kiley (2002) have pointed out that Calvo (1983) pricing
implies much more price dispersion induced by steady state inﬂation than Taylor (1980)
pricing. Ascari (2004) considers a standard New Keynesian model with trend inﬂation
and Calvo pricing, where those ﬁrms that are not re-optimizing their price cannot adjust
for trend inﬂation. He computes that a trend inﬂation rate of 5 % generates a steady state
loss7 of output relative to the zero inﬂation case of 11:5 % with Calvo (1983) pricing, but
only of 0.5% with Taylor (1980) contracts that have the same average duration over which
prices are expected to be ﬁxed. The reason is that trend inﬂation translates into much
more price dispersion with Calvo (1983) pricing. We are motivated by these ﬁndings to
undertake a systematic quantitative comparison of the welfare effects of monetary policy
over the business cycle across different assumptions about wage and price setting. In
order not to pick up any effects already emphasized by Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004)
and in keeping with much of the new Keynesian literature, we analyze an environment
with zero trend inﬂation.
7The loss reported here refers to the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and a markup of 10%. The loss is only
3% when there is an economy wide rental market for capital.
7We next turn to the description of the alternative price and wage setting schemes. We
can subsume 4 contracting schemes under the general framework provided by Wolman
(1999). The sticky information schemes requires a separate exposition.
3.1 4 sticky contracting schemes
Following Wolman (1999), we nest 4 considered models of price and wage setting as
special cases of the following set-up. Limited ability to reset prices is described by a
vector ®. The j-th element of that vector is the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts its price in
period t, conditional on the previous adjustment having occurred in period t¡j. One can
deduce from ® a vector !, denoting the fraction of ﬁrms charging prices set in period t¡j.
The Wolman (1999) scheme is very ﬂexible, it encompasses Taylor (1980) overlapping
contracts as a special case and can approximate Calvo pricing for large J.
There are two key differences between the Calvo (1983) price setting scheme and
the scheme proposed by Wolman (1999). The ﬁrst is that Calvo (1983) has an inﬁnite
tail: for any integer J there is a nonzero fraction of ﬁrms that last adjusted their price J
periods ago. In the scheme considered here, J is ﬁnite. Furthermore, under Calvo (1983)
pricing the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts its price in any given period is independent of
the time elapsed since the previous adjustment. A ﬁrm that has not adjusted its price
for say 10 quarters is just as likely to keep the price ﬁxed in period t as a ﬁrm that has
last adjusted its price in period t ¡ 1. Both the inﬁnite tail and the constant adjustment
probabilities of Calvo (1983) are often considered to be unrealistic. Nevertheless, the
Calvo (1983) scheme is often used under the implicit assumption that these particularities
do not inﬂuence welfare computations by much.
We compare the Calvo scheme for wage and price setting to 3 alternative contracting
speciﬁcations. To allow for a fair comparison, we require that the expected lifetime of a
newly set contract is equal across schemes. In such a way, no contracting scheme imposes
more exogenous stickiness on average. Using the general notation above the expected






j=0(1 ¡ ®j) with: ®0 ´ 0: (13)
For Calvo (1983) pricing, J = 1, ®j = (1 ¡ µ) for j = 1;2;::: and µ 2 [0;1). The
duration is given by:








We consider overlapping contracts in the spirit of Taylor (1980), a truncated version of
the Calvo (1983) scheme and a more general upward sloping scheme with time dependent
adjustment probabilities following Wolman (1999). We assume that no price or wage is
ﬁxed for longer than 10 quarters. Prices are assumed to be ﬁxed on average for 2 quarters,
whilewagesareﬁxedfor4quartersonaverage. Thechoiceofthesedurationsismotivated
in section 4. The vectors of adjustment probabilities is depicted in the table 1. In that table
the sufﬁx p refers to price setting and w to wage setting.
8Table 1: Conditional adjustment probabilities
®1 ®2 ®3 ®4 ®5 ®6 ®7 ®8 ®9 ®10
Taylor p 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taylor w 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wolman p 0.45 0.5 0.57 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Wolman w 0.1 0.18 0.25 0.3 0.39 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1
truncated p µp µp µp µp µp µp µp µp µp 1
truncated w µw µw µw µw µw µw µw µw µw 1
Price and wage setting is staggered under each of these schemes. At any point in
time the aggregate price or wage index is determined by the prices of Jp cohorts of ﬁrms
or wages of Jw cohorts of households indexed by when they last updated their contract.
Under Taylor pricing there are two cohorts of ﬁrms that charge prices lasting for exactly 2
periods. At any point in time half of the prices were determined yesterday and half today.
Similarly for 4 period wage setting. Under the Wolman scheme, the time proﬁle of the
conditional adjustment probability is increasing. This is an ad hoc way of capturing the
notion that the gain from adjusting prices when ﬁrms face ﬁxed adjustment costs should
increase the longer prices have not been adjusted. The truncated version of the inﬁnite
horizon Calvo (1983) scheme has a time invariant adjustment probability µp = 0:5 for
price setting and µw = 0:232 for wage setting that applies for periods 1 through 9. 10
periods after last adjustment, all contracts can be renegotiated.
While all contracting schemes imply that the newly set contracts have the same ex-
pected lifetime, the schemes differ with respect to the average time elapsed since last
adjustment (the age8 of contracts) at any given point in time as has recently been pointed
out by Dixon and Kara (2005). Calvo (1983) contracts have the largest average age, Tay-
lor (1980) contracts have the smallest average age. The following two graphs plot the
implied age distribution of wage and price contracts.9
10
3.2 The log-linearized price and wage setting conditions
In any given period, a ﬁrm faces a certain probability of receiving a signal that allows
that ﬁrm to reset its price. Firms that do not receive the signal, carry on the prices posted
in the last period and satisfy any demand at that price. Given the vector of adjustment
8The average age is deﬁned as follows. Let !j denote the fraction of contracts at any point in time that
were last adjusted j periods ago. The average age is
PJ
j=1 !jj. The !j can be derived from the vector ®
via recursions described in Wolman (1999).
9Note that graphs show that the fraction of contracts that is one period old (i.e. newly set contracts) is
equal across schemes. The same fraction of contracts are updated in each period, implying an equal average
expected duration of a newly set contract. This follows from the fact that the average updating frequency is
the inverse of the average duration.
10At any given point in time, the average age of a price (wage) contracts is 2 (4) for Calvo (1983)
contracts, 1.99 (3.54) for the truncated Calvo scheme, 1.84 (2.99) for Wolman contracts and 1.5 (2.5) for
Taylor contracts.






























Figure 1: Age distribution of wage contracts
probabilities ®, ﬁrms compute the probability that the price set today will still be in place
j periods from now, labeled Á
p





























Here, ¿p is a sales subsidy suitably chosen as to offset the steady state effects of mo-
nopolistic competition (1+¿p ´ ²
²¡1). The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for the optimal
nominal price P ¤

























Here, ¼t;t+j ´ ¦
j
k=1¼t+k, i.e inﬂation between periods t and t + j with ¼t;t+j ´ 1 Log-
























































































Figure 2: Age distribution of price contracts
Onecanshowthatitisnotnecessarytokeeptrackoftherelativequantitiesofintermediate
goods produced by the different cohorts of ﬁrms in order to solve the model. A relation
between aggregate inputs and aggregate output similar to what was pointed out by Yun



















For this pricing scheme it is also possible to show that the price distortion term Dt can
be ignored for a log-linear analysis around a steady state with zero inﬂation. One can
log-linearize the price distortion term together with the aggregate price index to show that
^ Dt = 0, if there is no trend inﬂation.
The wage setting problem is analogous. Given the vector of adjustment probabilities,
households maximize utility through choice of the wage subject to the demand curve
implied by the labour aggregator. Let Áw
j denote the probability that a wage set in period
t is still in place in period t + j. The ﬁrst order condition for the wage can be expressed









































t+k, i.e wage inﬂation between periods t and t + j and ¼w
t;t ´ 1.
At any point in time there are Jw such conditions determining the aggregate wage index,
corresponding to the ﬁrst-order condition of wage setters in the current and previous J¡1
periods.


































We use ^ ¹t as shorthand for the difference between the marginal rate of substitution and
the real wage: ^ ¹t ´ Â^ Lt + ¾ ^ Ct ¡ ^ wr


























The familiar framework of Calvo contracts obtains as a special case of this general
scheme. In particular, Jp = 1 and the adjustment probability is time invariant ®j =
1 ¡ µp, for j = 1;2;:::. Similarly for wage setting, there is a time invariant adjustment
probability µw. One could numerically simulate the economy with Calvo (1983) contracts
bytruncatingtheinﬁnitesumsforsomelargeintegerJp andJw. However, onecanexploit
the recursive representation of the inﬁnite geometric sums to obtain the well-known wage
and price Phillips curves.
b ¼t =
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)
µ
b Xt + ¯Etb ¼t+1; (25)
c ¼w
t =
(1 ¡ µw)(1 ¡ ¯µw)
(1 + ·Â)µw
b ¹t + ¯Etc ¼w
t+1: (26)
3.3 A variant of Mankiw and Reis (2002): Sticky information
We build a N-period version of the sticky information scheme by Mankiw and Reis
(2002). As with Wolman (1999) contracts, the arrival of new information is described
by a vector ®, whose elements are the same as in Table 1 for our earlier analysis. The
generic entry ®j denotes the probability that a ﬁrm that last updated its information set
in period t ¡ j receives a signal to update the information set in period t. In section 5
the adjustment probabilities referred to the signal to be allowed to change the contract
price. Hence, price setters must choose one price which does well on average over the
weighted future periods. Sticky information ﬁrms can change their price in any period.
We can think of the problem of a sticky information agent that receives the most recent
information set as choosing a whole path for the contract wage or price to be applicable
in the subsequent periods unless the agent receives another update of the information set.
Equilibrium sequences for allocations and prices in the model with sticky information
must then satisfy (32), (35) - (40) as well as the following conditions stemming from wage
and price setting. There are Jw cohorts of households11, indexed by how many periods
11We assume that sticky information pertains only to the households choice of the nominal wage, not to
the choice of consumption and state contingent bonds.
12ago they last received an update of their information set. The ﬁrst order condition of the
optimal nominal wage chosen by cohort j conditional on the information set at time t¡j



















Lt. Solving this for

















































We deﬁne the log-linearized optimality in conditions in terms of stationary variables
^ w¤
t;t¡j ´ ^ W ¤
t;t¡j ¡ ^ Wt¡j and ^ p¤
t;t¡j ´ ^ P ¤
t;t¡j ¡ ^ Pt¡j:





(1 + ·Â)^ ¼
w
t¡k ¡ ^ w
r






^ ¼t¡k + ^ Xt: (31)
4 The key equations and model calibration
In this section, we collect necessary conditions that must be satisﬁed by equilibrium se-
quences of allocations and prices for the case of Calvo (1983) wage and price setting.
The model has 7 endogenous variables: price inﬂation ¼t, wage inﬂation ¼w
t , labour Lt,
output Yt, marginal cost Xt, nominal interest rate Rn
t and the real wage wr
t. Market clear-
ing requires Ct = Yt, henceforth we drop Ct. The model’s equilibrium conditions are
summarized in the following box.










(1 ¡ µw)(1 ¡ ¯µw)
(1 + ·Â)µw
b ¹t + ¯Etc ¼w
t+1; (33)
b ¼t =
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)
µ
b Xt + µEtb ¼t+1; (34)
b Yt = b At + (1 ¡ ®)b Lt; (35)
c wr
t = b Xt + b At ¡ ®b Lt; (36)
c wr
t = c wr
t¡1 + c ¼w
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+ (1 ¡ ®2)®1^ ¼t + ®2 ^ R
n
t¡1 + vt; (39)
b At =½ b At¡1 + ut: (40)
Upper case letters denote the aggregate of the respective lower case variables. (32)
is the consumption Euler equation. (33) and (34) are the wage and price Phillips curves.
(35) is the log-linearized aggregate production function. (36) is the ﬁrm’s labour demand
function. (37) is an identity deﬁning the change of the real wage. (38) links marginal cost
to the output gap and the ”wage gap”. (39) is the monetary policy rule. Finally, the last
equation is the exogenous stochastic process for total factor productivity.
We now turn to the calibration. A time period is taken to be a quarter. The average
duration of newly set price contracts is set to 2 quarters. This number is somewhat smaller
than the average duration in most recent calibrated monetary models12. It reﬂects survey
evidence by Bills and Klenow (2004) pointing to much more price ﬂexibility in the U.S.
economy than typically assumed in the literature. Bills and Klenow (2004) ﬁnd that half
of all prices last 5 months or less when excluding temporary sales. For wage contracts
we follow Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004) and much of the literature and set the av-
erage duration to 4 quarters. A recent micro study by Rich and Tracey (2004) suggests
that U.S. wage contracts last on average 10 quarters, with a signiﬁcant fraction of con-
tracts negotiated annually. We do not calibrate the average contract duration to the data
for the purpose of comparisons with the existing studies on wage stickiness, that almost
universally assume annual contract duration.
The time preference rate is matched to yield an annual gross real interest rate of 1:03,
i.e. ¯ = 1:03¡0:25. The markup is calibrated to 15% in both goods and labour markets,
resulting in · = ² = 7:66. This value is intermediate in the range employed by other
studies. Keen (2004) and Collard and Dellas (2005) set the price markup to 10% while
Kollmann (2004) assumes 20%. Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) calibrate a wage
markup of 20%. The labour share in production 1 ¡ ® is set to the standard value 0.65.
We assume a Frisch (constant marginal utility of wealth) elasticity of labour supply of 1
3
(implying Â = 3), which is in line with most empirical estimates ranging between 0 and
12For instance, Kollmann (2004), Keen (2004) and Pappa (2004) assume an average duration of 4 quar-
ters.
140:5 as surveyed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). We set the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion ¾ to 2. This is a compromise between experimental evidence by Barsky, Juster,
Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) who ﬁnd a mean risk aversion of roughly 4 and the value of
1 commonly chosen in real business cycle models. The exogenous process for technology
follows an AR(1) with autoregressive parameter equal to 0:9. The innovation has standard
deviation equal to 0:00852. Following, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004), the standard
deviation of the monetary policy shock is set to 0:0025. Since the welfare costs of nominal
rigidities are highly sensitive to the monetary policy rule in place, we consider 3 different
rules. The reaction coefﬁcients describing these three rules are summarized in Table 2.
Rule 1 is our estimated on quarterly U.S. data over the sample 1980:1-2004:2.13 We
Table 2: The considered interest rate rules
®0 ®1 ®2
Rule 1: estimated 0:09 2:13 0.78
Rule 2: estimated, no output gap 0:00 1:90 0.77
Rule 3: Taylor (1993) 0:50 1:50 0.00
refer to the model with this monetary policy rule as our baseline model. Rule 2 is an
estimated rule where the response to the output gap is restricted to zero. The reason is
that the output gap is typically only marginally signiﬁcant or even insigniﬁcant and that
the adverse welfare effects of reacting to a wrong measure of the gap can be very large,
see Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004). We ﬁnally consider the classical Taylor (1993) rule
as a prominent benchmark from the literature.
The model is too stylized to estimate its parameters or rigorously calibrate them to
the data. However, we note that the overall amount of volatility present in the model is
roughly comparable to the data. For instance, the baseline calibration implies that the
standard deviation of consumption and hours worked in the model are 0.017 and 0.012,
respectively. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004) report that these numbers are 0.016
and 0.014 in detrended U.S. data. Extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the key
parameters is documented in the appendix.
The linearized model is solved using the MATLAB codes provided by Klein (2000)
and Juillard (2001).
13Data is taken from the FRED2 database. The interest rate is the end of quarter federal funds rate.
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FEDFUNDS/downloaddata/FEDFUNDS.txt) It is converted to
quarterly decimal rate by dividing by 400. The output gap is constructed as the log difference between
quarterly real GDP and potential real GDP as constructed by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce.
This data is available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC96/downloaddata/GDPC96.txt
and http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPPOT2/downloaddata/GDPPOT2.txt, respectively. In-
ﬂation is constructed as the log of the ﬁrst difference of the GDP price index available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCTPI/downloaddata/GDPCTPI.txt. All data except potential
GDP are seasonally adjusted. All coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at standard levels.
155 Welfare costs of nominal rigidities
This section computes welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations stemming from nom-
inal rigidities in wage and price setting. The welfare measure is the expected lifetime
utility of a randomly drawn household. We follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
















t denote period utility under perfectly ﬂexible wages and prices. The consump-
tion equivalent welfare measure L ´ ¡E
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E denotes unconditional expectation. Here, b p¦
t¡j ´ c P ¤
t¡j ¡ b Pt and similarly for c w¦
t¡j.
L gives the onetime increase in consumption, expressed as a percentage of period con-
sumption in the steady state, necessary to make agents as well off in a world with nominal
rigidities as in a world with perfectly ﬂexible wages and prices. Since this loss function is
free of ﬁrst moments, it can be accurately (up to second-order) evaluated by considering
a linear approximation to the model’s equilibrium conditions.14
For Calvo (1983) contracts, we have JP = JW = 1 and we could compute welfare
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µw·2(1 ¡ ®)(·¡1 + Â)
2(1 ¡ µw)(1 ¡ µw¯)
:
14It should be noted that to check the welfare calculations done here using the linear quadratic method
of Woodford (2003, chapter 6), the full nonlinear model was solved using a second-order approximation.
The welfare numbers computed in such a way were extremely similar to the ones presented using the
linear quadratic method. Differences in welfare computations appeared to be mainly due to numerical
approximation errors. The main reason to use the linear quadratic method of Woodford (2003) and Benigno
and Woodford (2005) is that it becomes feasible to analyze models with a large number of state variables.
Some of the sticky information schemes cannot be solved numerically using second-order techniques due
to the large number of state variables. However, one can still analyze welfare for those schemes using the
linear-quadratic approach.
16Notethattheweightonwagedispersion(~ ¸0)isroughly15timeslargerthantheweight
on price dispersion (~ ¸2) for our benchmark calibration. The higher weight attached to
wage dispersion depends on the labour supply elasticity. With sticky wages labour sup-
ply is demand determined. The inverse of the labour supply elasticity signals how much
compensation the household requires for supplying an extra unit of labour. When wages
are sticky, households are induced to vary their labour supply without any such compen-
sation taking place.15 Therefore, it is clear that the inverse of the labour supply elasticity
is closely related to the welfare cost of wage inﬂation. For instance, setting Â = 1 brings
the weight on wage inﬂation relative to price inﬂation down to 3:1 for our benchmark
calibration. Other important parameters determining the weights on wage and price dis-
persion are the elasticities · and ². The higher these parameter, the more substitutable are
different varieties of labour in production. Since welfare is decreasing in the dispersion
of goods or labour across varieties, a given amount of dispersion of relative prices results
in lower welfare when goods are more substitutable.
We next address whether choosing the average contract duration rather than the av-
erage age as a metric to make contracting schemes comparable inﬂuences our welfare
comparison systematically.
5.1 Average duration or average age?
Choosing the average contract duration as our metric for making different schemes com-
parable implies that the average time elapsed since last adjustment in a cross-section (the
average age) is different across schemes.16 In particular Calvo (1983) contracts have a
higher average age in a cross-section than Taylor (1980) contracts, despite the fact that
the expected duration of a contract is the same. For instance, our Calvo (1983) wage
contracts with µ = 3
4 are on average 4 quarters old, whereas our 4 periods Taylor (1980)
contracts are on average 2.5 quarters old. It is therefore of interest to ﬁnd out how the
welfare costs of nominal rigidities depend on the average contract age.
We show that the welfare costs of nominal rigidities under Calvo (1983) contracts are
non-monotonic in the average age of contracts. The following graph plots the welfare
costs of nominal rigidities as a function of the probability µ that the random signal to
change the contract is not received. Both the average age in a cross section and the
average duration of Calvo (1983) contracts are equal to 1
1¡µ.
Two effects inﬂuence the welfare costs, when agents can adjust their contracts less
often. More agents keep their contract ﬁxed and therefore do no respond optimally to
current period shocks. That effect tends to increase the welfare costs. However, those
agents that currently receive a signal to change their contract are attaching more weight
to economic conditions farther into the future as their contract is ﬁxed for a longer period.
They therefore tend to also be less responsive to current economic conditions and that
effect works to decrease relative price dispersion. The result is a non-monotonic relation
depicted in the above ﬁgures. Apparently, the two mentioned effects interact strongly
15An indirect compensation takes place, since ﬁrms make higher proﬁts when workers are paid a wage
that is off their labour supply schedule.
16For the Calvo (1983) contracts both the expected lifetime of a newly set contract and the average age
of contracts in a cross-section are equal to the inverse of the reset probability. For N period Taylor (1980)
contracts the expected lifetime is N and the average age is N+1
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Figure 3: Welfare costs with sticky wages and ﬂexible prices
with monetary policy as the location of the peak depends on the monetary policy rule in
place.17
























Figure 4: Welfare costs with sticky prices and ﬂexible wages
The message of this simple plot is as follows. When comparing welfare costs across
different contracting scheme holding ﬁxed the average contract duration we are in effect
comparing schemes with different average ages in a cross-section. However, on average
17If the shock has zero autocorrelation, than economic conditions in the period of the shock are most
different from those in the following periods. Therefore, the peak of the plot of the welfare costs with
respect to the average contract duration should occurs earlier than with highly correlated shocks. Numerical
results support this and therefore tend to support our line of intuitive argument.
18olderCalvo(1983)contractsdonotnecessarilyimplyhigherwelfarecoststhanonaverage
younger Calvo (1983) contracts, as the plot shows.
This hump shaped relation between contract duration and the welfare costs of nominal
rigidities is not speciﬁc to Calvo (1983) contract. Similar plots hold for Taylor (1980)
contracts, but the shape and the location of the peak differ.
5.2 Welfare costs of sticky contracting schemes
Table3displaysthewelfarecostofnominalinertiafortheconsideredcontractingschemes.
In that table, we express the welfare cost in terms of a per period compensation18 and as
a fraction of 1 per cent. We consider two comparisons. In the ﬁrst one, we hold the aver-
age duration of newly set contracts constant across schemes as is typical in the literature
(see Kiley (2002)). In the second one, we modify the vector ® of adjustment probabili-
ties such that the average age in a cross section is equal across schemes. The particular
average we choose is that of 2 period Taylor price contracts and 4 period Taylor wage
contracts, i.e. 1.5 and 2.5. Note that requiring equal average age as the Taylor scheme
involves shortening the average duration of the other schemes.
Table 3: Welfare costs of nominal rigidities - mobile capital
rule L (Calvo) L (tr. Calvo) L (Taylor) L (Wolman)
same average duration
Rule 1 0.215 0.156 0.063 0.110
Rule 2 0.324 0.217 0.078 0.146
Rule 3 0.135 0.160 0.154 0.180
same average age in cross section
Rule 1 0.125 0.117 0.063 0.097
Rule 2 0.166 0.154 0.078 0.127
Rule 3 0.199 0.197 0.154 0.190
The ﬁrst two rows of Table 3 show that the welfare costs of nominal rigidities may dif-
fer strongly across the considered contracting schemes when the average duration is held
ﬁx. This supports the view that the exact nature of price and wage contracting schemes
can be important for the quantiﬁcation of the welfare costs of nominal rigidities. In par-
ticular, under Taylor (1980) contracts the welfare costs are roughly of the same magnitude
as suggested by Lucas (2003), approximately 0.07 of one per cent of period consumption.
However, for the Calvo (1983) scheme they are roughly 3-4 times higher. The truncated
Calvo (1983) scheme and the Wolman (1999) scheme that have a 10 period support of the
age distribution of contracts deliver costs that are somewhat in between the costs implied
by the Taylor (1980) and the Calvo (1983) scheme.
However, consideringrule3showsthattheCalvo(1983)schemeneednotalwayshave
the highest welfare costs. This is in stark contrast to the unambiguous results for the case
18Given our unconditional welfare measure, per period welfare compensation and lifetime compensation
are proportional with proportionality factor 1 ¡ ¯
19of trend inﬂation in the comparison between Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980) contracts
in the work of Kiley (2002). In his steady state analysis, the prices farther out in tail of
the age distribution of the Calvo (1983) scheme differ more and more from the aggregate
price level due to the trend in the general price level. The Taylor (1980) scheme truncates
that tail and therefore necessarily implies smaller welfare costs. The conjecture by Kiley
(2002) that this basic insight would carry over to a welfare comparison over the business
cycle19 cannot be supported by our analysis. Must a contracting scheme that features a
wider support of the age distribution necessarily imply more dispersion of relative prices
or relative wages? Without trend inﬂation (or with full indexation to the trend inﬂation
rate) our results suggest the answer is no.
The intuition is as follows and similar to the one in the previous subsection. When the
age distribution has larger support, there are some agents that charge prices set farther in
the past. Their contract price tends to be more out of line with current conditions. While
thattypicallyincreasesthewelfarecosts, thoseagentssettingpricestodaywilllookfarther
into the future and also charge a price that reﬂects less on current economic conditions.
Therefore widening the support of the age distribution as done in the Calvo (1983) scheme
has an ambiguous effect on relative price dispersion and therefore on welfare. Whether
contractswithalargesupportoftheagedistributionorasmallsupporthavehigherwelfare
costs depends on the exact model dynamics, in particular on the monetary policy rule and
on the persistence of the shocks.
Finally, we note that by requiring that all schemes have an equal average age in a
cross-section, the difference in welfare costs across schemes is somewhat smaller. In
particular, the Calvo (1983) scheme now yields the highest welfare costs throughout all 3
monetary policy rules considered.20
5.3 Welfare costs of sticky information schemes
The loss function for the sticky information model is the again of the form (42). In that
formula, one must simply substitute b p¤
t¡j with the expectation based on the information
t ¡ j periods ago of the optimal price and c w¤
t¡j with the expectation based on the in-
formation t ¡ j periods ago of the optimal wage. In the following table we display the
welfare losses associated with different monetary policy rules and different assumptions
about the arrival rates of new information. These arrival rates are the ones described in
Table 1.
Table4showsthatthewelfarecostsofMankiwandReis(2002)priceandwagesetting
are typically very small. Apparently, the amount of price and wage dispersion induced by
the exogenous restrictions on the ability to reset contracts is much higher than the disper-
sion induced by restricting the arrival of new information. Qualitatively, this result should
not be surprising. After all sticky information agents will typically choose to post a new
price or wage even when they do not receive any new information about the state of the
world. They use optimally the information available in the period they last updated their
19Kiley(2002, p.291)conjecturesthatthegainsfrominﬂationstabilizationpoliciesinthemodelofErceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000) may be overstated due the choice of Calvo (1983) contracts.
20Extensive sensitivity analysis suggests that this is the case for a lot of parameter conﬁgurations, but
not for all. Even when requiring an equal average age, Calvo (1983) contracts may for some parameter
conﬁguration yield higher costs than Taylor (1980) contracts.
20Table 4: Welfare costs of nominal rigidities - sticky information
rule L (tr. Calvo) L (Taylor) L(Wolman)
same average duration
Rule 1 0.045 0.021 0.036
Rule 2 0.058 0.024 0.044
Rule 3 0.039 0.010 0.029
same average age
Rule 1 0.038 0.021 0.032
Rule 2 0.047 0.024 0.038
Rule 3 0.037 0.010 0.026
information set to infer about the state of the world today. Thus, the sticky information
framework typically involves less contract rigidity. The quantitative differences pointed
out here are important since more ad-hoc models of nominal rigidities are sometimes jus-
tiﬁed by arguing that agents have imperfect capacities to constantly compute and post
the optimal price. Our comparison suggests it may well make a difference for welfare
comparisons whether one explicitly models imperfect ability to process information as in
Mankiw and Reis (2002) or resorts to more ad-hoc models of price setting.
6 Robustness
So far we have assumed that capital is freely mobile across ﬁrms and can be re-allocated
as to equalize the shadow value of capital. Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Woodford
(2003, p.166) and others have pointed out that capital cannot be costlessly and instanta-
neously relocated across ﬁrms. Danthine and Donaldson (2002) view it as unreasonable
that it is too costly to post a new price tag, but that it is costless to unbolt machinery and
ship it between ﬁrms.21. Here, we check how the welfare cost of nominal rigidities across
the considered schemes depends on the mobility of capital.
For the purpose of business cycle analysis, capital might better be modeled as being
completely ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level on a quarterly frequency. The problem of the ﬁrm is to
choose its optimal nominal price P ¤


























21 Furthermore, Eichenbaum and Fischer (2004) show that departing from the assumption of perfect
capital mobility is necessary to reconcile the Calvo (1983) model with the data. Sveen and Weinke (2004)
and Woodford (2005) further discuss the implications of modeling capital for the equilibrium dynamics in
sticky prices models

























With ﬁrm speciﬁc capital and Calvo (1983) pricing, the Phillips Curve is now given by:
b ¼t =
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)
µ
(1 ¡ ®)
(1 ¡ ® + ®²)
b X
a
t + ¯Etb ¼t+1: (46)
Here, ^ Xa
t is average marginal cost. Since capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level, the capital-
labour ratio differs across ﬁrms and so does marginal cost. While the slope of the price




while the weight in the welfare function increases by exactly the inverse of that factor. A
given amount of inﬂation variability is roughly 5 times more costly than with mobile
capital for our benchmark values of ® and ². The same correction factors to the relation
between marginal cost and inﬂation and the welfare function must be applied for the more
general price setting model of Wolman (1999).
The reason why the weight in the welfare increases is as follows. Firm speciﬁc capital
implies that a given dispersion in relative quantities results in a much bigger dispersion
of labour across ﬁrms. Capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level, the ﬁrm can only adjust labour
to vary production. Since labour has decreasing marginal product in production at the
level of the individual ﬁrm, the dispersion of labour across ﬁrms is welfare reducing.22
Therefore, the weight attached to price inﬂation rises strongly with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital.
To understand why the slope of the Phillips curve falls, consider the problem of a ﬁrm that
receives a signal to change its price. By setting a lower price than the ﬁxed price ﬁrms
it can attract additional demand. But with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital marginal cost depends
on the ﬁrms’ own level of production while it only depends on the aggregate production
level with a common rental market. Therefore, the ﬁrm will choose a relative price that
deviates from unity by less when marginal cost depends on own output and therefore on
its relative price. As a result the variance of price inﬂation is smaller with ﬁrm speciﬁc
capital.23
Table 5 displays the welfare costs of nominal rigidities for the case of immobile cap-
ital. Whether we model capital as ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level or assume a rental market does
not have a large effect on the welfare cost for the benchmark calibration of this model.
This result depends crucially on the concavity of the production function with respect to
labour, i.e. on ®. The welfare loss with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital increases monotonically as ®
approaches unity, but remains bounded when we assume a rental market. For ® close to
unity the welfare costs with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital can therefore be much larger than under
the rental market assumption. The table shows that the loss with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital is
generally somewhat lower for the policy rules considered, but the difference is not huge.
22If ® = 0 production is linear in labour and capital does not enter the production function. One can
double check that our correction factor seems correct, by noting that it reduces to unity in that case as
intuition suggests it should.
23See Kimball (1995) for a discussion of assumption on factor markets on price setting and Ball and
Romer (1990) for the seminal paper on real rigidities.
22Table 5: Welfare costs of nominal rigidities - immobile capital
rule L (Calvo) L (tr. Calvo) L (Taylor) L (Wolman)
same average duration
Rule 1 0.190 0.145 0.066 0.111
Rule 2 0.287 0.204 0.082 0.147
Rule 3 0.129 0.152 0.152 0.184
same average age
Rule 1 0.124 0.117 0.066 0.099
Rule 2 0.165 0.155 0.082 0.129
Rule 3 0.190 0.189 0.152 0.184
In broad terms, the picture emerging from Table 3 is similar to that from Table 5. In par-
ticular, how we model capital does not seem to matter much for the relative welfare costs
of our 4 considered schemes.
7 Summary and conclusion
Our main ﬁndings have already been summarized in the introduction. Here, we only
brieﬂy sketch the papers main contributions.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the welfare costs of nominal rigidities depend very strongly
on the particular scheme used for introducing nominal rigidities. Contrary to the ﬁnd-
ing of Kiley (2002) for the case of trend inﬂation we do not ﬁnd that the Calvo (1983)
schemes necessarily overstates the welfare costs of nominal rigidities relative to contract-
ing schemes with a smaller support of the age distribution. In the baseline parameteriza-
tion of the model, Calvo (1983) contracts give rise to welfare costs of nominal rigidities
that are more than 3 times as high as for Taylor (1980) contracts. However, there are
monetary policy rules for which Calvo (1983) contracts may also imply similar or even
slightly smaller welfare costs over the business cycle than Taylor (1980) contracts. The
intuition for this result is as follows. When the age distribution has larger support, there
are some agents that charge prices set farther in the past. Their contract price tends to be
more out of line with current economic conditions. While that effect typically increases
the welfare costs, those agents setting prices today will look farther into the future and
also charge a price that reﬂects less on current economic conditions. Therefore widening
the support of the age distribution as done in the Calvo (1983) scheme has an ambiguous
impact on relative price dispersion and therefore on welfare.
We show how the welfare costs of nominal rigidities and the relative welfare costs
across modeling schemes depend surprisingly little on capital mobility. As discussed,
the reason is that immobile capital strongly increases the welfare cost of a given amount
of dispersion of relative prices but also generates less equilibrium price dispersion. We
ﬁnally analyze the welfare costs implied by the sticky information scheme of Mankiw and
Reis (2002). We apply the same restrictions on the availability of information costs as we
did in our earlier analysis on the ability to change contracts. The resulting welfare costs
23of the sticky information scheme however are much smaller.
24Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we document the sensitivity analysis undertaken. First, we show how
the welfare costs of nominal rigidities depend on the deﬁnition of the output gap. When
the central banks reacts to a gap measure deﬁned as the deviation of output from the
steady state, we have the following table:
Table 6: Welfare costs of nominal rigidities - deviation from SS
rule L (Calvo) L (tr. Calvo) L (Taylor) L (Wolman)
same average duration
Rule 1 0.381 0.2711 0.0953 0.1850
Rule 2 0.324 0.2167 0.0783 0.1457
Rule 3 1.043 1.2619 1.2648 1.4489
same average age in cross section
Rule 1 0.210 0.1952 0.0953 0.1582
Rule 2 0.166 0.1541 0.0783 0.1255
Rule 3 1.635 1.6181 1.2648 1.5553
Next, we present surface plots of the welfare costs of nominal rigidities for the Calvo
(1983) scheme and the of the Calvo (1983) relative to the Taylor (1980) when varying two
parameters while keeping the others at their benchmark value. We show that the welfare
costs of nominal rigidities are increasing in the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply Â, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion ¾ as well as the substitutability among
differentiated labour · and among differentiated goods ². The economic explanation for
this has been given in the text, it is not repeated here.
However, for any value of these key parameters governing the level of the welfare cost
and given our benchmark monetary policy rule the welfare costs implied by Calvo (1983)
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